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Abstract: With the advent of digitalisation, digital soft-wares enable the creation of 
extraordinary opening sequences, one such being the animated opening credits of Mamoru 
Oshii’s 1995 Ghost in the Shell, recently reproduced in Rupert Sander’s 2017 live-action film. 
This paper rethinks psychoanalysis and explores this analytic approach to film in and through 
its opening sequence by way of the following inquiries. What is the relevance of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis to the question of gender in the twenty-first century if gender is supposedly one 
of the defining ontological facets of human beings? Given the recent attention to the place of 
feminist politics, can we say that Haraway’s cyberfeminist take still has challenging potential 
in contemporary postgendered reality when Haraway herself has called her brand of politics a 
postgendered one? What if that which necessitates an address is not so much the place but also 
the temporal event that “animates” an individual’s consciousness, especially if perception is 
somehow tied to how we remember our past? Investigating how one’s imagination is 
“animated” in one’s encounter with an aesthetic object, this paper will elaborate the 
epistemological import of Lacanian psychoanalysis with critical analyses of the opening scenes 
of Tim Burton’s 2014 Big Eyes, and the aforementioned versions of Ghost in the Shell.  
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But, once adopted into the production process of capital, the means of labour passes 
through different metamorphoses, whose culmination is the machine, or rather, an 
automatic system of machinery (system of machinery, the automatic one is merely its 
most complete, most adequate, and alone transforms machinery into system), set in 
motion by an automaton, a moving power that moves itself; this automaton consisting 
of numerous mechanical and intellectual organs, so that the workers themselves are 
cast merely as its conscious linkages. In the machine, and even in machinery as an 
automatic system, the use value, i.e. the material quality of the means of labour, is 
transformed into an existence adequate to fixed capital and to capital as such.  
           (Marx, Grundrisse, 692) 
 
You are more than just a weapon. You have a soul… a ghost. When we see our 
uniqueness as a virtue, only then will we find peace.  
           (Daisuke Aramaki, Ghost in the Shell) 
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Introduction 
 
This paper is written due to the fact that filmic openers, besides the website, Art of 
the Title, have not been given its due attention as works of art. Art of the Title focuses 
primarily on the fonts of titles, text types that are appreciative of the filmic cast and crew, a 
laudable endeavour that I shall take on further by directing attention to its visual dimension. 
For those interested in openers of film or television series, the Art of the Title also historically 
contextualises title sequences created by Patrick Clair, Saul Bass, Kyle Cooper and Thierry 
Kuntzel. The latter, considered the first creator of titles by Thomas Elsaesser, is a video and 
installation artist, who directed the openings of Fritz Lang’s films M (1931) and the Most 
Dangerous Game (1932). As a film theorist, Kuntzel’s creative premise is to give “an 
overview and a formal analysis” of how a title sequence can be a dynamic process of 
analysis, the opener as a “mini-film” working in a post-filmic manner (Elsaesser and 
Hagener, 2005). More importantly, Kuntzel’s concern with the profound (sub)liminal effects 
of the iconic, the visual impacts of both word and image, aptly described in MoMa’s 
memoriam to his passing as “what happens beneath the surface of representation beyond a 
narrative storyline” (emphasis mine), is crucial not only to this paper on the aesthetics, the 
function and the purpose of opening sequences; it indicates how the audience achieves 
semantic denouement through the viewing process, narrative or otherwise. The above 
emphasis is also a pointer to how the deep-diving cybernetic figure of Rupert Sanders 2017 
Ghost in the Shell is an apt symbol of how one textual layer, the denotative, dialogically 
interacts with another layer, the connotative, so as to arrive at film analysis. Theoretically 
framed by poststructuralist thought, and thereby predominantly psychoanalytic, this paper 
reconsiders the opener as a liminal space, at once addressing neither an absolute narrative 
nor a complete theoretical frame, that simultaneously demarcates and adjoins the viewer and 
the viewed, explaining not only the various aspects of the opener but also its location of 
being neither completely on the inside nor the outside.   
 
Opening sequences can be suggestive means of access into the film: some are 
designed as aesthetic commentaries of the films; others indicate thematic concerns whereas 
some provide inscriptive backstory of the film of which the titles of Ridley Scott’s 1982 and 
2017 Blade Runner series are exemplary. The title opener to Blade Runner 2049, clearly a 
tribute to Scott’s 1982 Blade Runner, indexically functions as if it is a visual establishing 
shot, narratively setting the filmic backdrop, working in a manner dissimilar to contemporary 
opening sequences, which are more disjunctive and thereby surrealistic. Notwithstanding the 
fact that most dystopian narratives, contemporarily classified under “speculative fictions”, 
have rather simple fictional arcs, it is the post-human characteristics that make mysterious 
the cybernetic personas of the Blade Runner series, corresponding to the often theorised 
“uncanny valley” of digital animations, uncanny because these cybernetic figures are just 
too familiar to us. This enigma is depicted atmospherically in Scott’s use of colour and 
music, which are cryptically dark and starkly sonorous, itself a cinematic allegory of the 
psychoanalytic knot of the real, symbolic and the imaginary that gestures, at the same time, 
to how interpretatively opaque some openers can be to some audience.  
 
As a precursor to many science-fictional films, Blade Runner can be argued as having 
comparable traits to Oshii’s Ghost in the Shell, both stylistically or thematically. This paper 
works with cultural analysis, which explains the poststructuralist as well as post-Marxian 
analyses that includes Donna Haraway’s socialist feminist take, in order to philosophically 
address the manner in which filmic interpreters work with title openers to gain entry into the 
film. More significantly, this paper, in line with its political proclivity of being attentive to 
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the repressed, reworks the previously semiotic emphasis on the signifier in order to redress 
the postmodern conceptualisation of the materiality of the denotative, and, by extension, the 
connotative signifier in its reflective slant, a mirroring that explains how the science-fictional 
cybernetic has been, from time immemorial, more about man than machine. The mirror 
concept indicates as well how the various theoretical strands interweave: the Lacanian mirror 
stage that enables the formation of the I function can be analysed in relation to the 
subjectivity of the I in the feminist standpoint theory, the precursor of which is Haraway’s 
cyberfeminism. Moreover, the mirror stage is a liminal stage wherein the infant’s ego is 
constructed, the spectral ego accorded by the wholesome refection s/he sees that becomes 
the social ego in and through Symbolic processes of socialisation and naturalisation, a 
transition that, in Lacan’s psychoanalytic triad, dramatises a downward move from the 
imaginary to the symbolic on the side of that which is true: the wholesome selves we 
apparently experience are limited by the social structures and strictures we inhabit.  
 
Phillip K. Dick, although not in the know of psychoanalysis, seems to have arrived 
at the same philosophical conclusions with “Do Androids Dream OF Electric Sheep?” 
Rachael, the ethereal female protagonist in Blade Runner, may have unsettled the audience 
of the nineteen eighties with the unfortunate discovery of her android status, the prophetic 
stuff of dystopic science-fiction. but it is the ambiguity of the ontological identity of Rick 
Deckard, the replicant hunter of the Nexus 6 insurgents, which makes Scott’s 1982 science-
fictional adaptation of Dick’s “Androids” philosophically iconic – oddly invoking Mamuro 
Oshii’s Ghost in the Shell a tentative response to a question man will never be able to answer 
absolutely – thereby qualifying this address on the visually adapted versions of Dick’s story 
given that the stylistic impact of Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner could be felt throughout the 
decades that follow, a source code that proliferates to the differentiated visual codes of other 
speculative fictional films.  
 
Scott’s titular blade runner whose job is to hunt and put down robots, which in the 
opener is called “retirement”, was assumed human initially by viewers whose frames of mind 
have been deeply ingrained by dichotomous socio-political underpinnings. Its strong 
cybernetic undercurrents, however, visually signals the rise of what has come to be known 
in the twenty-first century as the “post-human”, a term that supposedly encompasses 
humanoids, androids, robots and cyborgs, although it mimetically points to homo sapiens 
rather than the humanoid by virtue of the fact that we are traced by the “inhumanness” of 
language, as indicated by Jacques Lacan’s infamous “the unconsciousness is structured like 
a language”. This is also the reason for including an analysis of Burton’s Big Eyes whereby 
the female protagonist finds self-redemption in full expression, bringing to the fore the 
linguistic grammatisation upon which consciousness is founded. Blade Runner 2049 
paratextually confirms the humanoid nature of the hunters, belatedly exposing the sameness 
that underpins both the filmic opponents. Despite this, I have to remark upon a slight 
difference detected in Scott’s 1982 and 2017 title sequences: the constructive appearance of 
a tree, perhaps the tree of life, and thereby knowledge, that follows the total blackout that 
initiates the 1982 version.  
 
This paper reworks Gerard Genette’s concept of the paratext to understand the 
function of “opening sequence” rather than “title sequence” because it does not address 
specifically the alphabetic. It concentrates on the visual imagery used in what is commonly 
known as “title sequence” in order to analyse how screen images symbolically or stylistically 
evoke the viewers’ mental processes. The interstitial location of openers indicate that they 
are not only aesthetic entrances into film; they provide cultural analyses of potential overlaps 
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– what some would call the “mirror” effect – between the imaginary world of the film and 
the real world by virtue of the mimetic quality of moving pictures, both elaborated by films 
adapted from a graphic novel as well as a biographical film, visual depictions of varying 
degrees of realism that also question the very nature of reality. This correspond to what Clive 
Myer designates as the diegetic and non-diegetic spaces of the “not-yet-film, film and not-
film” in “Theoretical Practice, Diegesis is not a Code of Cinema” to which I shall respond 
by adding terms such as “pro-filmic, filmic and post-filmic”, categories that are aligned to 
the discursive classifications of “film” as the material production itself, “cinema” as the 
corresponding discussions on film, analytical or narrative, and “movie” as an indicator to the 
economic and financial aspects of the film industry. The term, “filmic”, refers to the diegetic 
space of the movie while “pro-filmic” gestures to the so-called extra-diegetic elements that 
have effects on the filmic diegesis and “post-filmic” points to the activities that come after 
the film, including reviews, commentaries and critiques. These terms are attended to here 
because they bring to the fore Genette’s detailed analysis of the literary diegesis which has 
been appropriated by film theorists in their discursive analyses of film. Myer’s chapter in 
Critical Cinema accounts lengthily the historical development of cinematic diegesis, 
including a brief mention of Genette’s conceptualisation but not the etymological 
significance of the paratextual: the word-forming “para” signals both the “beyond”, 
“contrary” or “altered” and “defense” or “make ready”, definitions complicating the very 
concept of the filmic opener.  
 
This rethinking of the opening scene, with the concomitant terms mentioned, already 
implies a “network” structure, an intertextual homage to the (post)structuralists’ analyses, 
that permit communicative flows that are de-centralised passages, given that this cinematic 
epoch can be described as one of sequels, anthologies or series and remakes, a chain of links 
which I shall elaborate here with the paratextuality of the opener, discursively bringing to 
the fore what Genette in his footnote calls the slave to the master of the main literary or 
filmic text. And yet the aforementioned films can be viewed individually because they are 
feature-length films that are framed with individual plots. Thematic or intertextual 
connections are not always made by the viewers, especially those not looking for these 
allusions.  
 
This analysis, predicated on paratextual images, correlates to my attention on the 
socially underprivileged, “the second sex” of Simone de Beauvoir or the ones on the lower 
social rungs, and focuses on Genette’s concept of the “peritext”, a paratextual category that 
encompasses titles, epigraphs and prefaces, because opening sequences are visual 
correlatives of these accompanying texts, figurative doors opening onto inscriptive passages 
other than the filmic wherein the inscribed letters can be posted. Without discursive 
endeavours, we will not have the Derridean “supplement”, a signifying term he uses in his 
focus on textual “dissemination” or the Lacanian “objet petit a”, an object that allows 
imaginary projections, a “jacking in” described in High Tech Orientalism. This is a process 
made by the viewers as they mentally gain access into the screen, psychoanalytic bridges 
that allow different types of interpretative traversals, sense-making sojourns that 
paradoxically make obvious the question of the hermeneutic, the Derridean outside of 
nothingness that Scott’s 1982 opener inadvertently allegorised.  
 
Elsaesser, too, speaks of thresholds and paths that lead the film from and to the 
commercial machinery of film production, distribution and exhibition, which can be used to 
speak of the potential ramifications of too tight a capitalistic hold on film productions. As 
indices to the temporal underpinnings of Genette’s intertextual analysis, gestations on 
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“spatium”, the space of time instead of an actual place, are prompted wherein both the 
“space” of liberation and the “place” of security can be thought. The screen as door 
encourages processes of identification and projection, connotative processes that arguably 
incite psychoanalytic attempts to diagnose the patient’s “symptoms”.  
 
Here, I shall use this method to diagnose the “symptoms” of the dream-works of films 
because most opening sequences actually make manifest how dreams flow: a manner not 
unlike the Joycean stream of consciousness. While most critics think that “context” provides 
semantic stability, it is “context”, whether historical or cultural, that makes obvious the yet-
to-be-semantic slippage of the signifier. Buttressed by retrospective and anticipatory moving 
images, with multiple inward and outward brooks of immersive viewing experiences, the 
viewing process, further reinforced by classical Hollywood continuity filming, permits the 
imaginary insertion of the viewer making the audience lost in their illusory submersion. The 
viewers feel empowered by the visual immediacy of a cybernetic projectile leaping off a 
corporate office building, identifying with the cybernetic protagonist. Driven, of course, by 
a potent narrative on how anyone can be a superhuman being with the right technological 
enhancement, the multiple versions of Masamune Shirow’s Ghost in the Shell affirm even 
as they point to the dangers of a world overwhelmed by technology.   
 
The continuity-editing technique of Hollywood, a process that emulates the 
signifying linearity of human consciousness, also indicates how human consciousness can 
be commercially manipulated, an unpalatable underside represented by the ubiquitous 
holographic images of cyber-enhancement implants that advance our cerebral faculty and 
sensorial capacity in the 2029 dystopian world of Ghost in the Shell. This paper rethinks how 
our psychanalytic approach to film can be addressed with its opening sequence by way of 
the following inquiries. What is the relevance of Lacanian psychoanalysis to the question of 
gender in the twenty-first century if gender is supposedly one of the defining ontological 
facets of human beings? Given the recent attention to the place of feminist politics, which 
can be counter-argued with Jacques Derrida’s calling to question the place of women in his 
1982 interview, “Choreographies”, can we say that Haraway’s cyberfeminist take still has 
the same challenging potential in contemporary postgendered reality when Haraway herself 
has called her brand of politics a postgendered one? What if that which necessitates an 
address is not so much the place but the time of the event that “animates” an individual’s 
psychic process, especially when perception is somehow tied to how we remember our past? 
In other words, what can one deduce about popular imagination when human agency is 
empowered by that which can be described as “phantasmatic”? What can the stake be in a 
revolutionary actualisation motivated by fiction? These inquiries signal the rise of the 
postgendered non-binary and the propagation of divides beyond that of the conventional 
oppositions between the virtual and real, the apparitional and the substantial, by virtue of the 
advent of digital media. While Haraway’s socialist-feminist discourse has been used to 
support post-filmic analyses of Ghost in the Shell such as Natasha Miner’s 2014 essay 
“Technology, Psychology, Identity: Ghost in the Shell and .hack//Sign” and Marie Deanne 
Theresa O Correa’s review “Ghost in the Shell: A Cyborg-Feminist Review of Mamoru 
Oshii’s Animated Film”, I shall suggest that a close reading of Oshii’s Ghost in the Shell 
subtly subverts Haraway’s celebratory cyberfeminist rhetoric when the central cybernetic 
character self-consciously questions what it means to live as a man-machine hybrid, noting 
that the hyphenated identity here initiates already a shared existence. More importantly, the 
fact that Motoko Kusanagi poses questions already signals her self-aware sentience. 
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Of ontological significance to this analysis is the “mirroring” mentioned in the 
introduction of Techno-Orientalism by David S. Roh’s, Betsy Huang’s and Greta A. Niu’s 
as a citation from Toshiya Ueno, “the mirror of cultural conceit” (2015, 3) or explicated in 
“High-Tech Orientalist” as multiple reversals – distortions attesting to this thesis that the 
depicted cyborgian is in actual fact science-fictional commentaries of homo sapien. The 
inversion of the denotative mirroring of the imaginary by the symbolic after the connotative 
mirroring of the imaginary are intuitive manoeuvres provoked by sense-making processes, 
sensibly premised on the non-sense of unfiltered noise. Besides the human-android 
confusion is the discursive hegemony implicated by the power relays between the West and 
the East, an issue of labelling that Techno-Orientalism addresses by shifting focus to how 
the culturally dominated empire strikes back. Wester Wagenaar’s “Wacky Japan” briefly 
chronicles how first-wave Orientalism, the postcolonial creed of Edward Said, moves to the 
second-wave of Techno-Orientalism, which critiques the self-constitutional dominance of 
the Western othering gaze, that deviates to the self-orientalising third-wave of the Eastern 
idiosyncratic, a self-fashioning that hides so as to captivate. The fact that the imagistic opener 
contradictorily strips the cyborgian protagonist with a visual representation of its 
construction expresses rather crucially the “nothingness” of the textual outside. In other 
words, s/he, when denuded of her facial features and cybernetic covering, is not anything 
but a technologically wrought anatomy, a metallic mirror of organic bones.  
 
  
Suture in and through the Screen: The Post-Filmic within the Filmic 
  
Contemporary Hollywood is known now for its appropriation of the self-aware 
techniques of art-house productions, arguably the filmic niche that poses visual critiques of 
cultural commodification and massification, politics of cinema that points to how the extra-
diegesis of the post-filmic can be found within the filmic, even as Hollywood retains and 
intensifies its own norms. This sees a discerning film director such as Tim Burton paying 
homage as well as subtly undermining popular culture by making a biographical film on 
Margaret Keane who was psychologically overwhelmed by her big-eyed waif paintings. His 
film bears witness to how hyper-industrialisation in real-life, the RL of techno-orientalism, 
exacerbates psychological alienation, while a creative Oshii converts Shirow’s manga, 
Mobile Armoured Riot Police, to a thrilling, action-packed filmic virtualisation that can be 
re-projected to real-life instances of “industry”. These films signal a shift to post-classical 
styles, one surprisingly complying with the standardised norms of narrative construction, 
albeit still retaining some of the filmmaker’s surrealist tendency, whereas the other obviously 
challenging it by making an animated film quite unlike Disney animations, although, 
historically, the larger-than-life female eyes of popular Japanese anime are adopted from 
Disney’s productions.   
 
This paper investigates how opening sequence bridges the audience and the film, a 
comment that paradoxically points to a gap between the viewers and the viewed, a 
manoeuvre that sees this “mini-film” as an aesthetic review of what Lacan calls the “objet 
petit a” or Derrida’s “supplement”, the a of his differance signifying the etymologically 
archaic “idiotic” appendices, etymologically deriving the psychically idiosyncratic, the 
significance of which is made pronounced by what the blogger of le0pard13.com describes 
as “methinks” in his brief reading of Sander’s and Oshii’s openings to Ghost in the Shell. 
However, a word of caution to those unfamiliar with poststructuralist theories, these two 
concepts are distinct in their gendered senses. In fact, the only similarity they share is the 
role of a connective support when placed in a communicative context, a linking device, here 
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refigured as the “screen”, that actually points to communicative gaps rather than the seamless 
reality of which the technophiles dream.   
 
By virtue of the fact that this analysis predicates itself on how the cinematic frame 
activates human emotions at a meta-level, it addresses the manner of transcending divides 
rather than the postmodern blurring of divides, a manoeuvre that can be called “frameless 
framing”, with an aerial view that qualifies the comparability amongst the discussed opening 
sequences. Thus the titular use of “cyborgian” here, just like the opening scene to the film, 
can be inferred as an overriding of albeit via an implied acknowledgement of these limits. 
More importantly, it reconsiders how the (in)voluntary “subjective” submergence of the 
audience can lead to action in real-life, making a transition from the secondary level of 
connotation to the primary, denotative plane. It can be described as a “passing” from virtual 
reality to actual reality, a passing, which, in psychoanalytic theory, is animated with pathos 
rather than logos because it involves the desirous processes of fetishisation and reification.  
As a prolegomenon and an addendum, the opening scene, due to the way it is designed, not 
only serves as an introduction to the cinematic event; as an almost “eternalised” entity, it 
also reflects the aesthetic strategies, narrative devices and thematic concerns of the film. This 
“points of entry” into the film can be used to subvert the “frame by frame” linear convention 
that most practitioners use in describing film production because it can either engage a 
viewer with its drawing potential or, not unlike “the breaking of the fourth wall” technique, 
intervenes the viewing experience, leading to an inscriptive disengagement that may not be 
pleasurable to those finding escape at the cinema.  
 
With film entering the digital age, the opening sequence, with its position at the filmic 
edge, turns the window as frame to a door as threshold, which Elsaesser, following Genette’s 
cue on the peritext, states in his introduction to film theory. First, the motif of the door is 
crucial to contemporary exegesis because it leads to the analytical dimension of cultural 
discourses, indicating how the encrypted information received has contradictory fissures that 
require analytical stitches, and, second, this hermeneutic plane leads, at the film’s 
conclusion, to “nothing other than the original void”, an originary absence that will be 
elaborated by way of Jean Pierre Oudart’s Lacanian concept of “suture” because it primarily 
focuses on cinematic workings, theoretically explaining how the immersive process of film 
narrative works.  
 
I shall rework Oudart’s explanation in order to articulate something about 
“subjective” cinema, human individuals becoming subjects only by being subjected 
ideologically, which, in the psychoanalytic sense, means that it is an absence at the textual 
core that gives space to the substantiating presences of narrative voices composing the filmic 
texture, which George Butte’s “Suture and the Narration of Subjectivity in Film” addresses 
by redirecting Oudart’s filmic suture to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s figure of the chiasmus as 
an interweaving of narrative presences, a structure not unlike the hyperlinked configuration 
of the internet. Butte’s paper is significant because of his allusion to what he calls an 
“evasion of the experience of lack” with a viewing process that, as the continuity editing of 
Hollywood indicates, is constructed in a way that encourages vicarious enjoyment. His 
theoretical engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological reading of the psychology 
of film centres on the “nested frames of consciousness responding to consciousness in 
narrative that [he calls] ‘deep intersubjectivity’” (Butte, 2008), which brings to mind the 
appearance of harmonious communication among different characters and viewers, implied 
or actual. However, he does not highlight the fact that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
approach to film clearly underscores that this new psychology is one founded upon 
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“cinematographic illusion”, which recalls Myer’s theoretical concern of the turn from 
imaginary performance to social performance, a filmic to post-filmic move. The presences 
to which the former refers are not presences as traditionally understood; they are constructed 
presences just as identity, gender or otherwise, can be considered a social construction. 
  
 
The Cyborg Insurgency: A Workers’ Revolution?  
  
The epigraph from Karl Marx’s Grundrisse informs this section because I shall 
address the socialist side of Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto” before I go on to discuss how 
its revolutionary potential goes beyond contemporary feminism. Cyberfeminism, although 
still an approbate for the repressed third-world females, albeit those privileged enough to 
know that there are alternative realities to the oppressive one within which they find 
themselves, may not be that valid for the twenty-first century urbanised centres. If one has 
to deal with the question of the feminine, I would rather follow the Derridean lead by not 
repeating the phallocentric move in turning gynocentric because the zero of the female 
requires the one of the male in order to acquire the propriety of sense, aptly aligned to the 
contemporary uses of computerised code encryption called “bits”. Thus not only do we have 
to think of how to approach the question of the feminine that surpasses the issues of anatomy 
and biology, we would also have to find legitimate ways to counter acts of domination. 
Perhaps one should think in terms of a type of empowerment that grants not just agency to 
any oppressed individual, male or female; it is an avowal of the human individual’s natural 
rights as universally declared.  
 
This is in line with Sylvie Fogiel-Bijaoui’s insistent political calling for “the 
principles of equality and human dignity” (2016, 7) that female “substantive representation” 
accords. In other words, a woman’s formal rights to participation and political representation 
encompass her rights to be a part of the society within which she lives as well as the right to 
be different (2016, 5). Fogiel-Bijaoul’s borrowed Ulrich Beck’s concept of 
cosmopolitanisation which she explains: “cosmopolitanisation as lived experience often 
implies some individual or collective change, which is itself often unintended. Encounters 
with alterity may not be a sheer pleasure but people must develop a habitual readiness to 
cope with them. So, clearly experience of diversity fosters the ability to alter life scripts pre-
written by any community – of faith, tradition, religion or culture – and to draw selectively 
on a variety of different cultural repertoires” (2016, 2, emphasis mine). In other words, we 
have to be discerning not only in our lifestyle choices; we should exercise our judgements 
in what we (re)produce, thereby invoking the right to be recognised for our labour and not 
be coerced into becoming anonymous reproductive surrogates for others.  
 
The aforementioned pertains to hyper-industrialisation wherein the technological 
process of controls the entire production. What occurs is the appropriation of living labour, 
a phenomenon that leads to the objectification of living labour: “the transformation of the 
means of labour into machinery” and of “living labour into a mere living accessory of this 
machinery” (Marx, 1973, author’s emphasis). Living labour normally provides supervision 
to the production process. However, according to Marx, industrialisation means that the 
machine moves the unity of the production process, overtaking the static unity of the product 
itself and becoming “living machinery” (Marx, 1973). It controls the structures of production 
that, in turn, influences the economic organisation of society, leading to the 
instrumentalisation and dehumanisation of living labour. What Marx does not anticipate is 
the radical industrialisation that has occurred from the beginning of the 20th century onwards 
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whereby such objectification of “living labour” does not only affect the industrial and 
manufacturing sectors; it has apparently permeated all the organisational structures of 
capital. The Marxist critique of industrial alienation stems from the fact that the proletariat 
does not have a share in the production profits, a tenuous existential state worsened by the 
lack of recognition for their contributions. They are perceived as mere cogs in an industrial 
wheel, each playing a role in the mass production of commercial goods.  
 
With a global move from industrialisation to information technology, which occurred 
sometime around the middle of the twentieth century, alienated work can extend to those 
employed in the information sector. The films discussed here are cinematic commentaries 
on the incessant demands of service, resources and labour by global modernity. This also 
includes technologised militarism, (wo)man turned into weaponry for the destruction of the 
state’s enemies, an idea visually represented by the construction of a female cyborg warrior 
in the opening sequence of Ghost in the Shell. While Marx wrote in the late nineteenth 
century to contest the inherent economic exploitation of labourers by the capitalists, the 
Frankfurt School, in the middle of the twentieth century, discursively intervened the 
capitalistic control of culture. Qualifying that Theodore Adorno’s and Max Hockheimer’s 
critique is not against popular culture per se, I shall gesture to their political rhetoric as 
challenges not only against the ideological hold of the extensive production of popular 
culture or the use of mass communicative technologies for propaganda but also the 
proliferating uses of art or science for commercial or economic purposes.  
 
The Frankfurt scholars exposed the inherent irrationality behind the Nazi 
instrumentalisation of reason, an irrationality that now concerns post-industrialised societies 
in the form of information flows via communicative networks: in other words, the 
technological uses of mass communicative objects such as the radio and the television for 
ideological control, an issue made evident by the widely disseminated telecasts of 
propaganda speeches in the past and the seductive television commercials in the present. In 
an era of the “politics of lifestyle”, wherein the lifestyle one chooses is reflected in how one 
accessorises, the relevance of “Culture Industry: Mass Deception as Enlightenment” can be 
found in its critique of the commercialisation and standardisation of capitalistic activities, 
the apogee of which is the advertising of commercial products found on billboards, magazine 
advertisements and television commercials et cetera, and how these marketing strategies 
hone in on the ideological instilling of false needs in order to promote commercial 
consumption. Notwithstanding my sometimes consensual commercial participation, myself 
admittedly affirmative of the move to digitisation, it is important to educate the young in 
exercising judgement whenever they access the internet, go into the city, drive along the 
highways or turn on our audio-visual equipment at home. In other words, we cannot simply 
ignore the ubiquity of commercial advertisements, although one can actively resist these 
public temptations at every turn, uncluttering our minds. 
 
What then comes to the fore is the Enlightenment advocacy of treating living 
individuals as ends in themselves and not means, a maxim substantiated by the latent text of 
Burton’s Big Eyes wherein Margaret Keane is coerced into working sixteen hours a day in 
order to upkeep her spouse’s lifestyle. Having noted Burton’s unbiased attitude towards 
Margaret Keane’s paintings, an indisputable democratic premise that underpins popular 
culture, Burton’s amusing but acerbic portrayal of Walter Keane, a genius in marketing, 
satirises the unthinking reception of popular culture. And yet implicit in Burton’s film is the 
recognition of the ineluctable economic aspect of any artistic endeavour; it appears that 
capital will always win when the question of survival is broached.  
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When asked about the subjects of these paintings, Keane responds that he is inspired by the 
orphaned in post-war Europe. His answer is clearly an unmistakeable selling tactic, 
attestating to capital’s triumph. Where Margaret Keane is concerned, there is only the 
enigmatic “the eyes are windows to the soul”. Perhaps a psychoanalytic reading will shed 
some light on her vulnerability in the chauvinistic cultural environment of the mid-twentieth 
century, visual portrayals symbolic of the artistic and domestic repressions she has felt living 
at the end of an era that was defined predominantly by the professional invisibility of women. 
Set in the nineteen-sixties artistic niche of San Francisco, the film also wryly explores the 
rise of the postmodernist American culture, giving us alternating aesthetic appreciations 
from the elitist art critics such as The New York Times John Canaday, who sneered at Keane’s 
“infinity of kitsch”, and the opportunistic local newspaper writer, Dick Nolan, who uses the 
mass allure of Margaret’s painting as a newsworthy angle. Burton’s neutral attitude towards 
artistic “kitsch” is evident with the fact that he starts the opening scene with Andy Warhol’s 
commemoratory statement on how Margaret Keane’s paintings must be artistically 
successful because the masses adore them, signalling the postmodern emphasis on repetition, 
given the modern availability of mechanical reproduction enabled by copiers, cameras and 
computers.    
 
Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” 
espouses technological advancements because these provided changed conditions to 
reproduction, revolutionarily meeting the political demands of aesthetics even as his 
Marxian reference indicates an ambivalent attitude towards the progress made by mechanical 
reproduction. According to Benjamin, “Marx directed his efforts in such a way as to give 
them prognostic value. He went back to the basic conditions underlying capitalistic 
production and through his presentation showed what could be expected of capitalism in the 
future. The result was that one could expect it not only to exploit the proletariat with 
increasing intensity, but ultimately to create conditions which would make it possible to 
abolish capitalism itself” (Benjamin, 1969). These changed conditions also slowly 
transformed the socio-political superstructure the effects of which are “manifested in all 
areas of culture” (ibid). The cultural impact of mechanical reproducibility can be felt in his 
comment: “Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its 
presence in space and time, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be” (ibid), 
covertly reinforcing the notion of artistic authenticity. His subtle critique of the technological 
reproducibility of works of art can be detected when he informs us that “[t]he presence of 
the original is the prerequisite to the concept of authenticity” (ibid), inadvertently putting to 
question the mechanistic dissemination of prized artworks, previously valued for their 
authentic artistic techniques and material embodiment of creative ideas, with the discursive 
use of the word “depreciated”. To Benjamin, the Marxian critique of the political economy 
of capitalism inherently predicts a proletarianised future of even works of art. Whereas the 
rest of Benjamin’s text on mechanical reproducibility appears to argue for its democratising 
potential, the possibility of which is found in its ability to visually simulate and make 
accessible that which was previously available only to the upper classes: “One might 
generalise by saying: the technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the 
domain of tradition” (ibid), I sense a critical undercurrent that gestures to the problematic 
within the representational aspect of visual arts, one exacerbated by mechanical 
reproducibility, which is of import to artistic appreciation. First, the discourse indicates the 
possibility of misappropriating these artworks for commercial purposes and, second, it is 
this simulative dimension that provides the conditions for financial manoeuvrings. 
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Citing extensively Benjamin’s introductory sections on authenticity has something 
to do with this intuition of another level of connotation when it comes to technological 
reproducibility. By emulating our natural instinct to reproduce, the conditions given by this 
possibility of multiple copies could also be the cause for identity displacement, an 
ontological issue made obvious in the artistic supplanting of Margaret Keane by a marketing-
savvy Walter Keane and the extra-diegetic character shift from Major Motoko Kusanagi of 
the 1995 filmic original to Major Mira Killian who finds out that her real identity is Motoko 
Kusanagi in the 2017 live-action remake. Such displacing acts, which paradoxically 
destabilises filmic identity, is a process that also changes the term “frame-by-frame” to the 
“frame-to-frame” denotative narratological process in order to bring about the appearance 
of seamless story-telling. On a connotative level, this “frame-to-frame” process enables a 
shift from mere story-telling to the theoretical act of narratological analyses that take the 
filmic to the post-filmic plane of reviews, commentaries and journal article.  
 
Burton’s Big Eyes opens with a visual metaphor of the capitalistic manipulation of 
artworks, whereby a painting of a child with exaggerated, teary eyes is subjected to 
mechanical reproduction. This mise en scene of Margaret’s painting being reproduced into 
cheap posters on a massive scale is an ironic illustration not that dissimilar to Benjamin’s 
discussion on the mechanical reproducibility of artworks, a visual vignette of incessant 
technical replication occurring for capitalistic gains. It corresponds to Benjamin’s 
description of how the masses desire to “get closer” to works of art they find appealing, an 
idea that Walter Keane himself uses to justify his actions, “People don’t care if it is a copy. 
They just want art that touches them”. How can art as rote repetition touch us emotively 
when we can see exact copies hanging on the walls of every contemporary bourgeois? 
Technological reproducibility provides the conditions for the economic abuse of Margaret 
Keane’s paintings; it is means to extract some kind of sameness even from that which is 
artistically unique, an analogous treatment that corresponds to the exploitation of Margaret 
Keane herself, who becomes a metaphor for the living machine, an accessory that churns out 
paintings after paintings.  
 
With the ability of endless multiplying, technological reproducibility “substitutes a 
mass existence for a unique existence. And in permitting the reproduction to reach the 
recipient in his or her own situation, it actualises that which is reproduced” (ibid). To give 
Benjamin credit, he attempts a reinterpretation of mechanical reproducibility by pointing to 
how modes of perception are activated when viewers look at the artistic copies, allowing and 
actualising new perceptual structuration. Whether this new organisation of perception 
materialises a remarkable piece of art is another matter. If there is any theoretical affirmation 
of mechanical reproducibility at all, it is Benjamin applauding the accessibility of visual 
pleasure given by technological advancement even as his writing evinces an ambivalent 
attitude toward the possibility of reproducing countless copies, implicitly acknowledging the 
fact that the mechanical reproduction of artworks erodes its aura and thereby its authentic 
value.  
 
Margaret’s initial acquiescence to her husband’s commercial machinations can be 
attributed to the financial concerns she has. She is later bullied into locking herself in a room 
so that she produces hundreds of paintings for which Walter Keane takes credit. This 
relationship subsequently turns sour because of the falsehoods that underscore their business 
partnership. The hallucinatory episode she experiences at the supermarket indicates her 
repressed psychic condition after years of living a lie, not having any authentic, meaningful 
social contact. The edutainment value of the aforementioned filmic works of art can be found 
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in their provocation of a social awareness of how domination, male or otherwise, found in 
the demands for mindless reproduction can lead to estranged labour, thereby having negative 
effects on the psychic state of urbanites living in the twenty-first-century cities.  
The second half of the twentieth century saw the emergence of socialist feminism in a brand 
of cyberfeminism introduced by Haraway and other feminist standpoint theorists such as 
Hilary Rose and Sandra Harding, leading to the post-cyberfeminism of the twenty-first 
century. Post-cyberfeminism does not depart from Haraway’s original premise. Instead it 
radicalises her theoretical emphasis on cyberspace as a site of essential emancipation. Their 
theories are premised on the relations between the production of knowledge and the practices 
of power. These feminist theorists challenged patriarchal power relations by focusing on 
socially situated knowledge out of which a standpoint can be made, advocating a political 
activism that liberates women from the concomitant patriarchal underpinnings of Western 
Enlightenment. Due to the theoretical attention given to Oshii’s and Sander’s opening 
versions of Ghost in the Shell, Haraway’s socialist cyberfeminist discourse in “A Cyborg 
Manifesto” struck a resonance in an era when the place of many women was still in the 
domestic arena. Having said that, a recent reading of this text has found some of Haraway’s 
writing dynamic and inspiring, a metaphorical writing that attempts to go beyond gender, 
race or class restrictions and, more importantly, alienated labour: “The cyborg is a condensed 
image of both imagination and material reality, the two joined centres structuring any 
possibility of historical transformation.… The cyborg is a creature of the post-gendered 
world; it has no truck with bisexuality, pre-oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labour or other 
seductions to organic wholeness through a final appropriation of all the powers of the parts 
into a higher unity” (Haraway, 1991, emphasis mine). My emphasis in this citation from 
Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto” explains not only the significance of the Lacanian 
“suture”, a reparative stitch of the Imaginary and the Symbolic but also the ultimate upending 
of Haraway’s affirmative discourse, already intuited in Oshii’s dystopian world. This 
psychoanalytic notion will demonstrate how a subject’s imagination and the surrounding 
material reality, in Haraway’s vocabulary, can be connected in and through a filmic 
imaginary, explicated with the filmic concept of diegesis. Thus the frame is in place for a 
de-framing performativity; this “raking of the frame” gives to a reading in the form of a 
cinematic enonce, according to Oudart, whether in the form of a filmic narrative or a cultural 
aesthetics. Suture, a theoretical conception first introduced by Jacques-Alain Miller was 
appropriated later by Oudart for describing the process of film viewing, which when 
reinforced by the diegetic filmic notion, points to a bridging by the objet petit a, a 
communicative connection in lieu of a gap found right at the edge of the mise en scene, what 
the poststructuralists call the radical boundary, radical because it simultaneously permits the 
divergence and convergence of the inside and the outside.  
 
This psychoanalytic absence at the limit is not the categorical separation that we 
understand normatively; it is a consequence of the symbolic residing within the imaginary 
and the imaginary within the real, evincing an empty locus because of multiple erasures, the 
primordial lack, denoted by Scott’s 1982 opener, functioning as provocation to filmic 
reading, which at the perceptual level, can be theoretically called the film narrative. This 
level of narrativising can be brought to a different level motivated by the film critic’s desire 
for analysis. This paradoxical motif of absence at the edges can be explained by the filmic 
gaps which the opening sequence allegorises in the manner which it is designed, a manner 
that gestures to the Freudian dream-work with its concepts of condensation, displacement, 
and secondary revision, a dream sequence that is made evident by the surrealist 
superimposition of images, directly reminiscent of Rene Magritte’s and Salvador Dali’s 
paintings, in the opening sequence to the latest Dick’s short-fictional inspired anthology, 
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Electric Dreams, an opening quite distinct from Scott’s not only in terms of atmosphere; its 
staccato visual insertions and imagistic uses of the “eye” note the visual aspect of the 
viewer’s gaze and its subsequent narrative appropriation. Moreover, the multiple appearance 
of this “eye” motif implies a returning gaze coming from within the screen, an anonymous 
other gazing at the viewer’s gaze, heightened by a chromatic, laser-lit shot that viscerally 
draws the gazing into the screen.  
 
Because of its artistically seductive array of imagery, our perceptual consciousness 
is pushed to the next level in an interpretative attempt, a metafictional level that analyses the 
visual language with focus given to the different intensities and textures of filmic 
signification. Thus Myer’s “contextual imaginary” is located along the axial line connecting 
the Symbolic and the Imaginary in Lacan’s psychoanalytic triangulation. This discussion 
notes that the Symbolic is alternatively called the Law-of-the-Father and the Imaginary is 
aligned with the maternal, which in Oshii’s Ghost in the Shell, is symbolised by the psychic 
union between the feminised Major and the masculinised Puppet-Master – despite the much 
commented transgender traits of the latter – embodied in a young female at the conclusion 
of the film. 
 
Haraway’s cyberfeminism holds in tension the two perceptions underpinning the 
possibility for identity formation in cyberspace: she recognises that this male-dominated site 
also provides female users immense potential in undermining gender inequality and space 
for identity recreation. Following O Correa’s citation of Catherine Belsey in her review, it is 
not anatomical or biological equality that women seek but the commensurateness in power. 
This remark is critical to an analysis of the visually dynamic illustration of the physical 
prowess of Kusanagi in the opening scene of Oshii’s 1995 adaptation of Shirow’s manga of 
the same title, realistically fleshed out by the biomechanical construction of Major in 
Sander’s 2017 Ghost in the Shell, a female protagonist with a human brain encapsulated in 
a synthetic shell. A critical inquiry into the physiological appearance of the female 
protagonist and the number of images of Kusanagi’s nakedness are shown in the animated 
film proper disavows any feminist potential of A Ghost in the Shell. These depictions of 
female nudity appear not only to reinforce the biological inequality between man and 
woman; they actually confirm that rousing desire is key to commerce. Sander’s version, on 
the other hand, ensures that Major’s mechanised body appears enclosed in an artificial shell. 
It is disappointing that the latter omits the scene wherein the animated (wo)man-machine 
figure twirls in a foetal position before emerging from her aqueous womb. In fact, Sander’s 
version visually and atmospherically evoke the opener to Jonathon Nolan’s and Lisa Joy’s 
2016 Westworld, an adult theme park which is, in essence, a world rather than a theme park, 
to paraphrase one of its creators. This not only indicates the importance of worldliness given 
by the painterly of digitisation but also how the robots are similarly flayed anatomically even 
as their synthetic construction gradually unfolds in the title sequence, which is remarked in 
the seventh episode title of its second season, “Les Ecorches”, meaning “flayed”. 
 
Created by a representative from Hanka Robotics, a government-funded corporation 
involved in the experimental hybridisation of the synthetic and the organic to produce 
technologically augmented soldiers, Major joins an anti-terrorist unit, known as section 9, to 
fight cybercrimes. In order to do this, the cyborg-crime fighters have cable ports installed at 
the back of their necks so that they can “plug in” for a cybernetic deep dive into the synthetic 
minds of their enemies for information retrieval. It is the diving into a geisha’s robotic brain 
that her psyche is hacked by her nemesis, the Puppet-Master, thereby allowing the latter to 
gain the upper hand, prompting her to rediscover her past. Sander’s version makes 
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pronounced Major’s ontological estrangement, brainwashed and unknowingly suffering 
from a stolen identity, her organic brain has been fed memorious details that are not her own. 
Without a past that she possesses, memories that make her who she is, Major becomes 
psychically disturbed, at various filmic moments, by her resemblance to the synthetics she 
fights. Becoming an instrument of combat, she is easily manipulated by Dr Ouelet, the 
robotics specialist answering to Hanka Robotics, who advises her that memories do not 
define her, it is her actions that do.  
 
Human consciousness is informed by memories which, in turn, affect perception and 
behaviour. This means that our perception will also influence our actions. Our sense of self 
is determined by both thoughts and actions, not just one or the other. According to the 
standpoint feminists, we should take a political stance even if one can be informed only in a 
socially situated manner, standing for and by what we believe in. Butte, in his historical 
contextualising of the Lacanian suture, refers to Kaja Silverman’s and Danial Dajan’s 
apparently irrelevant discursive takes on the concept, which delve into the Althusserian 
dimension of the filmic suture. I shall suggest that if we are speaking of how film narratives 
incite action, then this belief in a cause, political or otherwise, is that which makes us 
ideologically subjected and thereby a subject in our subsequent performativity. This means 
that the notion of ideology cannot be ignored when discussing agency and action, the very 
vocabulary of “subjectivity”.  
 
Standpoint feminism propounds a polemic stance due to its attention to power 
relations. This theoretical assertion is laudatory, given that, in general, political activism 
means acting or speaking against the dominant ideology without complete knowledge, 
forgetting that there is always a taint in the mirror of politics. Major’s negative response to 
Dr Ouelet’s encouragement that she is the first of her kind and the future of humankind 
implies a disconcerted psychic state. Neither completely synthetic nor fully organic, Major 
feels isolated despite the many reminders that she has a “ghost”. In the cyber-universe of 
Ghost in the Shell, an individual with a “ghost” means that she, unlike the other robotic 
entities, has consciousness and concomitantly a soul. This testifies to the significance of 
having a mind, an inner space and a viscerous voice  of one’s own, to reiterate with a 
difference Virginia Woolf’s “a room of one’s own”. With hindsight, the surreal images of 
opening sequences reiterate visually Joyce’s and Woolf’s poetic technique of stream of 
consciousness. 
 
Sander’s remake of Ghost in the Shell has been criticised for not rendering the 
philosophical leanings of Oshii’s version well. But the opening sequence is an aesthetically 
astute rendition that demonstrates how Major’s human brain can be connected artificially to 
the rest of her synthetic shell. It is via an advanced functioning neural network that sends 
physiological stimuli to the brain, which then disseminate brainwaves to the rest of the 
physical body. Physiologically, this does undermine the Cartesian duality because it 
demonstrates how our bodily pulsations affect the brain and vice versa. But how far can this 
physiological premise go when the title itself and the multiple references to Major’s “ghost” 
indicate that human consciousness is the defining attribute of individual identity. Thus the 
Cartesian “I think, therefore I am” becomes validated rather than negated, further confirmed 
by Major’s ironic reply to Ouelet’s remark which implies that the replicative production on 
a massive scale her successful prototype makes her feel abandoned rather than treasured.  
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The Psychoanalytic Suture in Popular Culture 
  
Myer’s theoretical thesis has as its fundamental the division between the filmic world 
and the real world. Conventionally, the opening sequence is designed to provide filmic hints 
to the viewers and it is through this filmic imaginary, expanded to a hierarchy of narrative 
levels, that plot and thematic connections can be made between the filmic world and the 
actual one. This transposing process means that cinematic intelligibility becomes enhanced 
by the film’s illusory presence, a movement of the image to word as we tease out an 
interpretation from the writerly text so that we can get a readerly one. This description will 
be reiterated later albeit in a psychoanalytic manner. Myer’s historical tracing from Plato’s 
concept that unifies mimesis and diegesis to Genette’s various definitions of diegesis, 
including the intra- and extra-diegeses, provides a comprehensive account of this literary 
and filmic term. It is, however, Paul Ricoeur’s advice against the superimposition of mimesis 
and diegesis that is of interest here. This analytical concept not only explains the reason for 
the use of this phrase “the suspension of disbelief” in our viewing of film fictions, attesting 
to the imaginary as Plato’s cave; it has ontological implications when referring to the filmic 
or realistic worlds. Intermingling the filmic mimetic and its counterpart, the diegetic, does 
explain the immersive experience of character identification and narrative projection. 
However, if we take as true the conventional view of films serving as “mirrors” to reality, 
then what follows will be Myer’s “ideological black hole” that sucks in what is normatively 
known as reality as well, which the opener to the 1982 Blade Runner indicates.  
 
In fact, one can say that this science-fictional opener may be prescient by virtue of 
the fact that the visual immediacy accorded by this unprecedented flow of information via 
communicative technologies has made RL almost indistinguishable from VR, an issue that 
Jean Baudrillard forewarns in his tirade against the hyper-simulation, making the endless, 
repetitive copying valueless, reinforcing Benjamin’s concept of the aura and my argument 
that authentic self-consciousness is crucial to our existence in this contemporary, 
cosmopolitan world. One of the dangers of this visual proliferation making the spectacular 
the opiate of the masses is deception, making e-vices the prompters to cyber-security, which, 
judging from the notifications of improving changes in online security and privacy from 
Jstor and other commercial or non-commercial webpages, is the current topic of concern.  
While Myer does not include the revolutionary possibility given by digitisation, Haraway’s 
theorising is the obverse. This ability to simulate reality to a level that makes the virtual more 
real than the real can be affirmative in provoking effective political activism, which Sander’s 
version, criticised for its diluted, accessible adaptation of Oshii’s filmic original, undeniably 
proposes. This digital transition, supported by Lev Manovich’s theoretical elaboration in 
“What is Digital Cinema?”, is reworked here by the discursive idea of “cinema”, Myer’s 
oxymoronic concept of “contextual imaginary”, so as to indicate the gendered dimension of 
the Lacanian terms, something that Myer’s chapter does not address. Manovich’s thesis 
argues that the digital process of filmmaking takes cinema away from its photographic 
origin; the nature of its operation brings it closer to painterly techniques. The opening 
sequence of Oshii’s Ghost in the Shell illustrates this painterly technique, with an imagistic 
making of the cybernetic body, what fans call “The Shelling Sequence”, available online. 
Sander’s version is comparably similar, another shelling that sequentially gives flesh to 
Oshii’s version. Musically similar to the latter’s iconic soundtrack of classical Japanese folk 
music imbued with a Hungarian flavour, Kenji Kawai, the original composer, is ushered in 
to recreate the score for the live-action remake, a haunting accompaniment to the divine 
iconicity in a cyborgian creation, sentient because of the organic brain installed in the 
humanlike carapace. The 2017 opening sequence differs from the 1995 sequence in these 
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ways. The first has to do with the visual atmosphere. Oshii’s version is more detailed, neon-
coloured, and anatomically precise. Sander’s version, darkened and therefore more cryptic 
in style, starts the visual depiction with the rising and merging of neural filaments, creating 
the cyborgian body’s network significant to its physiological functioning. Both versions 
show a female figure rising to be enveloped in synthetic skin, which is followed by its 
metamorphosing to the almost complete human appearance. According to one of the fan 
websites, Oshii’s version makes Major more doll-like than the female protagonist in the 
manga version. Sander’s opening sequence takes a step further this doll-likeness, visually 
attesting to a sequence of scenes in Oshii’s animated film where images of Motoko Kusanagi 
are juxtaposed with that of bare mannequins on a display window, ideologically implying 
that the synthetic shell which, by the way, belongs to Megatech, the animated film equivalent 
of Hanka Robotics in Sander’s version, is that which leads to the objectification of an 
individual: Kusanagi as a female object of desire, Kusanagi as an instrumentalised cyborgian 
crimefighter, Kusanagi as the object of the psychoanalytic gaze. Thus the aforementioned 
film analysis demonstrates how cinematic movements can arise from the framed filmic shots, 
with the use of the word “cinematic” here indicating the discursive dimension of film studies.   
 
Instead of photographic realism as its source, Manovich’s article suggests to me that 
digital cinema, with a painterly origin, encourages the creation of diverse realities, making 
available realities other than the one we know and inhabit, a crucial statement attesting to 
the psychoanalytic concept of the imaginary, arguably a feminine notion. The filmic concept 
of diegesis, as explicated by Myer, examines how the exteriority of cinema affects the film’s 
interiority or otherwise. This theorising of filmic covertness bears testament to this reading 
of the opening sequence as an aesthetic allegory of Myer’s “contextual imaginary” that can 
contribute to a psychoanalytic rethinking of human consciousness, which the 
aforementioned films assiduously represent.  
 
Despite Myer’s detailed elaboration of how the filmic diegetic can be used to link 
imaginary action and social actions, it is not precise enough a critical address of what agency, 
autonomy and action mean, especially when the psychoanalytic concept of the imaginary is 
given its due attention. Strangely, Myer does not use the Lacanian-Miller psychoanalytic 
term, “suture”, in his address of how film is crucial to this transference of imaginary action 
to social action. This term suggests that it is psychic triggers that motivate action – how 
signifiers attach themselves to our psyche – leading to consequences in our manner of being. 
This is something that commercial advertisers know and manipulate in designing their 
commercials. It is a tactic similar to the one used in propaganda wherein repetitive telecasts 
will ensure successful psychological instillation and manipulation. When alluding to 
cinematic projections, which the opening sequence is one instance, the process of suture, as 
expressed by Oudart, is activated by virtue of a doubling movement between two fields, the 
visual field of the imaginary, conventionally known as the diegetic space of the film, and an 
absent field which echoes the imaginary field, the extra-diegetic location of a symbolic field. 
This absent field, to the audience, is a subjective site that permits any viewer narrative 
structuration, an idea that Benjamin mentions in his essay on mechanical reproducibility but, 
in cinematic analysis, it is more a location of objectivity than subjectivity because this is 
where discursive linearity occurs. This momentary space is the place where the retroactively 
semantic is activated with the filmic signified presiding over a signifying exchange between 
the viewer and the viewed, a metonymic movement the crux of which is the exchange value 
of the iconic for the linguistic articulation of its message. Oudart states that “Thus what we 
are here calling the suture is primarily the representative of that which, under the same 
heading, is now used to designate ‘the relationship of the subject to the chain of its 
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discourse’”, a chainlike process that takes the imagistic over to the linguistic. It can function 
in an intra-diegetic manner as in the climactic scene of Big Eyes, wherein the courtroom 
drama not only presents to us a female victim filing a lawsuit against her husband for labour 
exploitation; it designates a shift from a visual text to a linguistic one and then back to the 
visual, a movement also reflected her performance, painting the waif paintings, during the 
first half of the film that moves to her verbal contestation at the law court followed by a 
returning visual performance in front of the judge and jury, a form of bearing witness to her 
abusive marriage.  
 
The suturing operation, in psychoanalytic identification, stitches the viewer on the 
edge of the filmic exterior into the filmic interior so that the viewer, who is moved by the 
onscreen narrative of the female protagonist, becomes psychologically entangled with the 
filmic persona. For those who have suffered under patriarchal control, they will identify with 
Margaret Keane’s initial anguish and applaud her later defiance of Walter Keane’s hysterical 
domination. Comparably, most individuals who have experienced oppression will find 
psychic resonances in Major’s characterisation and feel reinvigorated by her decision to fight 
bureaucratic control in a bid to regain her sense of self. The concept of suture, by way of its 
functioning, demonstrates the manner in which an engaged viewer can be turned into a 
subject. In terms of cinematic projection, it testifies to the allegorical nature of opening 
sequences so that the filmic experience can also be a profound, meaningful one. Whereas 
Myer’s use of the word “imaginary” indicates the power of filmic narratives in provoking 
social action, the descriptive word “contextual” that comes before it implies thought, 
attesting to my earlier assertion that analysing and conceptualising human consciousness, 
which is of pertinence to personal or communal identity, can be a complex and intricate 
undertaking, an endeavour that proves that the cyberfeminists may be right in equating our 
brain functions to that of computation only because we are the ones who created computation 
in order to enable faster data analysis.  
 
Digitalisation transforms our relationship with reality, a change symbolised by the 
“digital rain” found in Oshii’s opening scene. This endless rows of encrypted codes that 
began as zeroes and ones, appropriated and made iconic by the Wachowski brothers in the 
Matrix trilogy,  affirms the existence of different worlds, alternative realities no longer 
referential in the analogue sense. In coining the term, “differ-petit-ance”, Myer’s theoretical 
tribute to Derrida’s “differance”, another name for his “supplement” and Lacan’s “objet petit 
a” does not attend to the feminine, explaining the significance of my attention to the 
imaginary here. If Oshii’s shot of the digital rain signifies a cyborg’s direct access to the 
cyber-net, then Derrida’s “differance”, a repetition-in-difference, is the word to note, a 
choral net-working, evanescently evoked by Kawai’s music, that is more communal than 
individual, given his use of the word “chiasmus” in his “inter-view” with Christie McDonald, 
entitled “Choreographies”. This concept is comparable to Butte’s concept of “deep 
intersubjectivity”. The imaginary does not subscribe to normative gender distinctions 
because it is psychically feminine in an artistic sense, in a way releasing anatomical 
difference, analogous to the transitional nature of the opening scene. These scenes not only 
reinforce the idea of the filmic frame; they, more importantly, testify to a void fundamental 
to artistic interpretations. In other words, these scenes can invoke filmic intelligibility, albeit 
derived from an aesthetic sensibility, which takes us from the imaginary to the symbolic by 
way of our propensity for narrative coherence and discursive cohesion.  
  
 
 
Goh, C.                                                                                                                              92 
 
Conclusion 
  
Instead of points of entry, the conclusion of this paper focuses on the opening scenes 
as points of exits, a critical move that attempts a beyond from that of imaginary identification 
or projections with attention given to the pleasures derived from cultural analyses. Most 
opening sequences are not designed in a linear fashion due to its brevity. The multiple 
functions of the title sequence stated earlier already imply that what the audience receive is 
thoughtful juxtaposition of images and words designed to create a signifying effect on the 
viewer. Thus opening sequences are cultural occurrences, imaginary sites re-turning as 
symbolic places, attesting to the Lacanian thesis that the psychoanalytic terms of the 
imaginary, symbolic and real are inextricably intertwined. These opening images can be 
received as mere flow of images to those who merely want entertainment, imagistic play to 
those attentive to them as visual creations or stylistic and thematic indicators to those whose 
intent is to analyse these images for commentaries. They provide, instead, hermeneutic 
satisfactions rather like the psychoanalytic processes of ego construction. The digital ability 
to transform frames to thresholds means that these enticing entries can also become 
signifying exits. This means that the screen as a framing device is tenable only as the 
Lacanian Mobius strip, a strip with a half-twist such that the inside becomes outside and the 
outside inside. The framing device is technically in place to enable both the narrative linking 
of filmic scenes at the denotative primary plane and the analytic exegesis from the 
connotative, secondary plane. In other words, the screen surface, although appearing 
contained, actually denotes a liminal situation, one indicating the proximity of narrative 
construction or the theoretical remoteness implied by film analysis, both a protective filter 
having intra-diegetic implications as well as the multiple discursive layering of extra-
diegetic commentaries, an artistic impasse that is the very condition for an aesthetic passage.  
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